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Rethinking Yugoslavia: Serbian
Intellectuals and the ‘National
Question’ in Historical Perspective
JASNA DRAGOVIC´-SOSO
In the Yugoslav lands, as in the rest of central and eastern Europe, the cultural sphere
has often acted as a surrogate for politics, and intellectuals have traditionally been
at the forefront of debates on questions of both nation and state. Throughout the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the absence of a large educated class in
Serbia ensured that political authorities often recruited intellectuals for a variety of
duties, sometimes as state bureaucrats and administrators, sometimes as the ideological
vanguard (or at least as the providers of an authoritative endorsement) of state policy.
Along with this tradition of reliance on and co-operation with the state, there was,
however, another tradition: that of intellectuals acting as the critics of the political
powers and their actions. The first half of the twentieth century in particular saw the
rise of a fledgling class of – perhaps not ‘free-floating’ – but certainly independent-
minded intellectuals as a separate voice on the public scene. The Second World
War and the communist takeover temporarily suspended this process, as Yugoslav
intellectuals – like their counterparts in the rest of eastern Europe – were either
silenced or relegated to a dependent role in the ‘building of socialism’. Yet once
again, with the progressive (though not constant, regionally consistent or complete)
liberalisation of the Yugoslav public sphere after 1948, many intellectuals did manage
to assume a more critical stance without facing the dire consequences encountered
by their other east European counterparts.
Within this wider intellectual engagement, the issue of statehood has been parti-
cularly important. The rise of nationalism as a political ideology in the early nine-
teenth century was based on the principle that ‘the national unit and the political unit
should be congruent’, as Ernest Gellner succinctly put it, and many Serbian
intellectuals – unsurprisingly and unexceptionally – wanted the reality to correspond
to this ideal.1 The ‘Serbian question’ thus arose concurrently with the birth of the
small, autonomous Serbian principality in 1830, which left the vast majority of Serbs
outside its borders. The goal of liberating Serbs from foreign rule and uniting them in
a common state became the overarching national mission of both political and intel-
lectual elites for much of the subsequent period. Yet, with the Balkan wars of 1912–13
and the creation of the first Yugoslav state in 1918, a new reality confronted Serbian
elites: the ‘liberation and unification’ of Serbdom inevitably brought with it other
I should like to thank Audrey Budding, Marko Bulatovic´, Aleksa Djilas, Dusan Djordjevich, Dennison
Rusinow and Stevan K. Pavlowitch for their comments on an earlier version of this article.
1 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 1.
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Balkan peoples cohabiting with the Serbs in these areas.2 Throughout the twentieth
century and until Yugoslavia’s demise in 1991 the ‘Serbian question’ showed itself
to be more complex than simply making the political unit correspond with the
national one; it meant conceptualising a state that would be viable despite its national
diversity.
This article will examine the last attempt made by Serbian intellectuals to con-
ceptualise a democratic ‘third’ Yugoslavia before the common state disintegrated into
war in 1991. It will do so in the light of both the historical approaches to the issue of
statehood in Serbian political thought and the specific context of the 1980s, in which
the revival of the intellectual debate on the ‘national question’ took place. It will assess
the nature, viability and significance of the most widely endorsed political platform
issued by Serbia’s intellectuals during this period – the ‘Contribution to the Public
Debate on the Constitution’ of 1988. Remarkably, this document has been almost
completely neglected in scholarship, primarily due to the overwhelming focus on the
1986 ‘Memorandum’ of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Yet in contrast to
the ‘Memorandum’, which was disclosed unauthorised before it was completed and
approved even by the Academy, let alone more widely, the 1988 ‘Contribution’ was
publicly debated and put to a vote in Serbia’s most important cultural and scholarly
institutions. Second, while the ‘Memorandum’ is more accurately described as a
repository of Serbian nationalist grievances than as a ‘blueprint’ for action, the 1988
platform was clearly prescriptive in character, with specific proposals for a new
Yugoslav constitution.3 It is thus this virtually unknown document – rather than
the much discussed ‘Memorandum’ – that best represents the Serbian intelligentsia’s
approach to the common state in the last years of Yugoslavia’s existence.
The historical legacy: concepts of the state until 1945
Three concepts of the state emerged from within the ranks of Serbian political and
intellectual elites from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century: first, that
of a centralised state which would ‘liberate and unite’ Serbs and which could take
the form of either an enlarged Serbia or some sort of wider ‘Yugoslavia’; second, that
of a more decentralised ‘Yugoslav’ federation or confederation, with its ‘large’ and
‘small’ variants depending on the number of South Slav national groups it was meant
to encompass; and third, that of a specifically Serbian national state as an alternative
to any notion of South Slav union.
Until the creation of the first Yugoslav state in 1918, it was the first option
that predominated in Serbia, initially aimed at extending the small Serbian state
westwards and southwards into lands still under Ottoman rule. Serbia’s first national
2 This was a new dilemma. At the turn of the twentieth century the ethnic composition of the
Kingdom of Serbia was still 90 per cent Serb. See John Lampe, Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a
Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 47.
3 For an elaboration of these arguments concerning the ‘Memorandum’ see Jasna Dragovic´-Soso,
‘Saviours of the Nation’. Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism (London: Hurst, 2002),
177–95.
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programme – drafted as a secret document by its leading statesman Ilija Garasˇanin
in 1844 under the title ‘Nacˇertanije’ (Plan) – thus envisaged the creation of a ‘great,
new Serbian state’, which would include Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and
northern Albania.4 The changes Garasˇanin made to the original draft of the text –
replacing references to ‘South Slav’ with ‘Serb’ and leaving out the sections on
co-operation with the Croatian Illyrianists and the promotion of the ‘Yugoslav’ idea
within Serbia – indicate his preference for an enlarged Serbia over that of a wider
Yugoslav union.5 Garasˇanin did not, however, exclude the idea of such a union at
some future time, as shown by his advocacy of contacts with Bulgaria and an extension
of Serbia’s influence in the Habsburg lands.6 Indeed, in the 1860s, Garasˇanin’s national
programme as expressed in the ‘Nacˇertanije’ was transformed into a broader Yugoslav
project, including plans for a future union with Bulgaria and the Habsburg Slavs.7
The two goals – the unification of Serbs and a future unification of South Slavs –
were thus not seen as mutually exclusive or conflicting. In the dominant stream of
Serbian national ideology, they were, however, generally conceived as an extension
of the Serbian state, which was to play the role of a regional ‘Piedmont’.8
In contrast to this goal of an expanded Serbia, another conception of a more
decentralised South Slav state was also beginning to emerge, notably within the ranks
of Serbian socialists. In 1872 their leading figure, Svetozar Markovic´, first coined
the term ‘Greater Serbian’ to characterise the attempts of the Serbian regime ‘to
create out of the present-day Serbian principality a large, semi-independent or fully
independent state, by the simple annexation of neighbouring Serbian lands’ and to
impose on them ‘the same legal and economic relations, with all their consequences,
that have existed and continue to exist in Serbia’.9 Instead, he advocated the creation
of a ‘Balkan federation’, based on an indigenous social and national revolution against
Ottoman (and potentially also Habsburg) rule, which would guarantee the right
of each nation to ‘constitute an autonomous group within the union’.10 This
second, more ‘decentralist’, option also had its advocates in parts of the Habsburg
4 ‘Garasˇaninovo Nacˇertanije’, in Radosˇ Ljusˇic´, Knjiga o Nacˇertaniju (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1993), 158.
5 The original text was drafted by the Moravian agent Frantisˇek Zach, working for Prince Adam
Czartoryski’s Polish e´migre´ organisation seeking to curb Russian and Austrian influence in the region.
For the changes Garasˇanin made to the text, see Charles Jelavich, ‘Garasˇanins Nacˇertanije und das
großserbische Problem’, Su¨dostforschungen, 28 (1968), 131–47. Both texts can be found in Ljusˇic´, Knjiga,
130–65. Garasˇanin’s motives in making these changes have remained a matter of heated debate in (post-)
Yugoslav historiography. Overviews can be found in Ljusˇic´, Knjiga, 18–43, and Wolf Dietrich Behschnitt,
Nationalismus bei Serben und Kroaten, 1830–1914 (Munich: Oldenburg, 1980), 267–70.
6 ‘Garasˇaninovo Nacˇertanije’ in Ljusˇic´, Knjiga, 155–65 passim.
7 See notably David MacKenzie, Ilija Garasˇanin: Balkan Bismarck (Boulder: Westview, 1985), 289–93.
8 Ivo J. Lederer, ‘Nationalism and the Yugoslavs’, in Peter Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, eds., Nationalism
in Eastern Europe (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), 424–5. On the ‘Piedmont idea’ see
David MacKenzie, ‘Serbia as Piedmont and the Yugoslav Idea, 1804–1914’, East European Quarterly, 28,
2 (1994), 153–82.
9 Svetozar Markovic´, ‘Srbija na istoku’ (1872), quoted in Vasa Cˇubrilovic´, Istorija politicˇke misli u Srbiji
XIX veka (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1958), 302.
10 Svetozar Markovic´, ‘Socijalizam ili drusˇtveno pitanje’ (1874), quoted in Behschnitt, Nationalismus,
107.
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Serb elite, and progressively even gained ground in Belgrade intellectual circles.11 By
the time the Yugoslav unification loomed at the end of the First World War, clear
divisions had emerged among intellectuals concerning the question of the internal
organisation of the state: one group, close to the dominant Radical Party, argued that
Serbia deserved a leading role in the new state thanks to its wartime sacrifices and
ultimate victory, and advocated centralism under the Karadjordjevic´ dynasty along
the lines demanded by the Serbian government; another, smaller, but prestigious,
group of scholars preferred a federal republic, or – as they put it – a ‘United States of
Yugoslavia’.12
Although Serbian intellectuals generally saw the new Yugoslav state as a fulfilment
of Serbia’s quest for the ‘liberation and unification’ of Serbdom – which largely
accounts for the ease with which Serbs gave up Serbia and identified with the new
state – divisions between ‘centralists’ and ‘decentralists’ remained throughout the
interwar period. Whereas the former adhered to the unitarist vision of the nation (of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as ‘three tribes of one nation’) and believed that only a
centralised state would be strong enough to resist both internal centrifugal pressures
and external threats, the latter argued that state centralism would in fact hinder the
development of national unity, and – as a 1922 survey by the journal Srpski knjizˇevni
glasnik (Serbian Literary Gazette) showed – they generally supported a conciliatory
attitude towards Croatian demands and a granting of greater rights to the historic
provinces.13 Indeed, it appears that in the 1920s it was the ‘co-operative’ rather than
the ‘unitarist’ vision that predominated among Serbian intellectuals (in contrast to
the monarchy and the two leading political parties, the Radicals and the Democrats),
and most did not see the centralist 1921 Constitution as a viable way of resolving the
dilemma of Yugoslavia’s internal state organisation, especially with the opening of
the ‘Croat question’.14 In the 1930s many Serbian intellectuals became increasingly
critical of King Alexander’s reorganisation of the state into nine geographically and
economically defined units (banovine), which aimed at promoting Yugoslav unity
by reducing the number of provinces and fostering economic integration.15 As this
reorganisation failed to achieve genuine unity or mitigate the royal dictatorship,
intellectuals began to advocate options that ranged from greater autonomy for the
existing banovine to the establishment of different units – on the basis of other
geographic and economic criteria, or in the form of the historic provinces, or even
11 For the Habsburg Serbs, see Dimitrije Djordjevic´, ‘The Serbs as an Integrating and a Disintegrating
Factor’, Austrian History Yearbook, 3, 2 (1967), 48–82. For Serbian intellectuals, see Ljubinka Trgovcˇevic´,
Naucˇnici Srbije i stvaranje Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga/SKZ, 1986), 259.
12 Trgovcˇevic´, Naucˇnici, 248–82.
13 Miroslav Janic´ijevic´, Stvaralacˇka inteligencija medjuratne Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Institut za drusˇtvene
nauke, 1984), 123.
14 Andrew Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 82, and Branka Prpa, ‘Jugoslavija kao moderna drzˇava u
vidjenjima srpskih intelektualaca, 1918–1929’, Ph.D. thesis, Belgrade University, 1996.
15 Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 165–8.
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some form of Serb – Croat – Slovene ‘trialism’ (although this last one was a minority
view).16
The 1930s were primarily marked by an increasing disillusionment with
Yugoslavia, not only among non-Serbs, who viewed continued state centralism and
the ideology of Yugoslav unitarism as merely a mask for Serbian hegemony, but also
among Serbian intellectual elites, who saw Croatian (and to a lesser extent, Slovenian)
desires for greater autonomy as a betrayal of the common Yugoslav ideal, for which
the Serbs had sacrificed their independent state and had experienced such suffering
during the war.17 The government’s attempt finally to resolve the ‘Croat question’ by
the creation of an autonomous Croatian banovina in 193918 particularly contributed
to the intellectual reconsideration of Serbs as a separate national entity whose interests
in Yugoslavia now needed to be examined independently. Arguing that the Croatian
banovina – forged out of the historic provinces of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, with
the addition of parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and encompassing 768,000 Orthodox
Serbs and 144,000 Muslims19 – was merely ‘the first phase in the creation of a Greater
Croatia’,20 a group of prominent intellectuals gathered around the Serbian Cultural
Club, set up in 1937, now began to call for a defence of Serbian interests and the
creation of a Serbian territorial unit within Yugoslavia. As the prominent historian
and jurist Slobodan Jovanovic´ put it in a 1939 lecture: ‘When a Croatian ethnic unit
is defined, inevitably a Serbian ethnic unit must be defined . . . When the Croatian
question is raised, inevitably so is the Serbian question, and we must, with united
forces, defend what is ours’.21 The calls for a Serbian unit did not necessarily translate
into a rejection of Yugoslavia, however. While there were some voices within the
Club that warned of Yugoslavism as a ‘Trojan horse’ and announced that ‘wherever
there are Serbs, that is Serbia’, the majority of Serbian intellectuals continued to
defend the necessity of Yugoslavism as a ‘state idea’.22
The third state concept, of a ‘Greater Serbia’ as an alternative to Yugoslavia,
appeared only during wartime and represented a marginal phenomenon that attracted
virtually no support. This option briefly presented itself in 1915 following the
16 I thank Dusˇan Djordjevich for indicating this point to me. For the range of reactions to the
reorganisation of the state under the dictatorship, see Branko Petranovic´ and Momcˇilo Zecˇevic´,
Jugoslovenski federalizam: ideje i stvarnost. Tematska zbirka dokumenata, 1 (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1987), 317–423.
17 ‘U ocˇekivanju odluke’, editorial of 29 Feb. 1940, in Srpski glas, the journal of the Serbian
Cultural Club, cited in Miodrag Jovicˇic´, ed., ‘Jako srpstvo, jaka Jugoslavija’. Izbor cˇlanaka iz ‘Srpskog
glasa’, organa Srpskog kulturnog kluba, 1939–1940 (Belgrade: Naucˇna knjiga, 1991), 132. For an analysis
of this disillusionment, see Marko Bulatovic´, ‘Struggling with Yugoslavism: Dilemmas of Interwar Serb
Political Thought’, in John Lampe and Mark Mazower, eds., Ideology and Identity: Southeastern Europe in
the Twentieth Century (Budapest: CEU Press, 2003).
18 All areas of public policy other than foreign affairs, military and finance were to be administered by
the banovina.
19 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Serbia. The History behind the Name (London: Hurst, 2002), 132.
20 Editorial, 23 Nov. 1939, in Jovicˇic´, ‘Jako srpstvo’, 16.
21 Slobodan Jovanovic´, ‘Jugoslovenstvo u prosˇlosti i buducˇnosti’, 7 Dec. 1939, in Jovicˇic´, ‘Jako srpstvo’,
50.
22 ‘Srpska jedinica’, editorial, 25 Jan. 1940; M. M., ‘Gde god je Srba – tu je Srbija’, 14 Dec. 1939; and
Slobodan Jovanovic´, ‘Jugoslovenstvo u prosˇlosti i buduc´nosti’, 7 Dec. 1939, in Jovicˇic´, ‘Jako srpstvo’, 103,
57–8 and 51 respectively.
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conclusion by the Entente of the secret Treaty of London with Italy, promising
the latter Austrian territories, including all of Istria and Dalmatia, to secure its
entry into war against the Central Powers. Although Serbia was not party to this
agreement, it was to be given parts of the Adriatic coast south of the ‘Italian’
Dalmatia and, in spring and summer 1915, Allied diplomats also approached the
Serbian government with offers of further territorial compensation for a ‘Greater
Serbia’ (including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Srem, Bacˇka and Slavonia), in return for
ceding Vardar Macedonia to Bulgaria. There is, however, no evidence that the
Serbian government seriously pursued this ‘Greater Serbian’ alternative to Yugoslav
unification.23 As Kosta Pavlowitch notes:
Had [Serbia] set aside the Yugoslav option in favour of a Greater Serbia, it would have had difficulty
justifying to the allies the full extent of its territorial claims, thus leaving its national integration
incomplete, with many Serbs still living as minorities in Italy, Hungary or a rump Croatia. Neither
would it have altogether avoided the national problems that were to plague Yugoslavia, adding
large Croatian, Muslim and Hungarian minorities to the Albanian and still undefined Macedonian
populations Serbia had taken on after the Balkan Wars.24
Furthermore, the entry into war of the United States, which publicly refused
to recognise the secret treaties, effectively cast doubt on whether such territorial
arrangements would even be honoured.25
The notion of a ‘Greater Serbia’ appeared again in more radical form in the
circumstances of extreme destruction and suffering of the Second World War, which
saw a systematic policy of mass extermination applied against Serbs in the Independent
State of Croatia.26 This plan for ‘an ethnically homogenous Serbia encompassing
those ethnic territories inhabited by Serbs’ was proposed within the ranks of the
Chetniks (but never adopted as an official programme) by Bosnian Serb lawyer
Stevan Moljevic´, a former member of the Serbian Cultural Club.27 It was based on
the argument that only the creation of a separate Serbian national unit, accompanied
by an exchange of populations, could prevent ‘a repetition of the terrible crimes
that occurred . . . on the whole territory where Serbs and Croats were mixed and
23 Djordje Dj. Stankovic´, Nikola Pasˇic´, saveznici i stvaranje Jugoslavije, 2nd edn (Zajecˇar: Zaduzˇbina
Nikole Pasˇic´a, 1995), 139–71.
24 Kosta St Pavlowitch, ‘The First World War and the Unification of Yugoslavia’, in Dejan Djokic´,
ed., Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea (London: Hurst, 2003), 41.
25 Andrej Mitrovic´, ‘The Yugoslav Question, the First World War and the Peace Conference, 1914–
20’, in Djokic´, Yugoslavism, 50. Indeed, even Italy did not get all the territories promised by the Treaty
of London.
26 Although the figures of Yugoslavia’s war losses are disputed, two independent studies undertaken
in the 1980s,one by the Croatian scholar Vladimir Zˇerjavic´ and the other by the e´migre´ Bosnian Serb
statistician and lawyer Bogoljub Kocˇovic´, put the total number of war victims for the country at just above
one million, approximately half of whom were Serb (487,000 according to Kocˇovic´ and 530,000 according
to Zˇerjavic´). Although the proportional losses sustained by the Serbs, Croats and Muslims in regard to their
total population in Yugoslavia were in the same range, in the Independent State of Croatia a substantial
difference is clear: Serbian losses were 334,000 or around 17 per cent of their total population, while
Croatian and Muslim losses were 203,000 (6 per cent) and 75,000 (8.6 per cent) respectively. Bogoljub
Kocˇovic´, Zˇrtve drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji (London: Nasˇe delo, 1985), and Vladimir Zˇerjavic´, Gubici
stanovnisˇtva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu (Zagreb: Jugoslavensko viktimolosˇko drusˇtvo, 1989).
27 For the various Chetnik conceptions see Petranovic´ and Zecˇevic´, Jugoslovenski federalizam, 821–5.
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where Croats and Muslims planned to exterminate the Serbs’. Yet even Moljevic´
envisaged the establishment of this ‘homogenous Greater Serbia’ as the first step in
the creation of a ‘federal’ Yugoslavia of three units (Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia).28
The idea of Serbia as an alternative toYugoslavia was only articulated in a series of
unsuccessful memoranda to the German authorities by members of the pro-German
collaborationist Nedic´ regime and the fascist-inspired followers of Dimitrije Ljotic´ in
occupied Serbia (though not by Ljotic´ himself ).29 With the victory of Tito’s Partisans
in 1945 this ‘Greater Serbia’ option effectively disappeared, only to be revived in the
circumstances of Yugoslavia’s disintegration and wars of the early 1990s.
Communist Yugoslavia and its discontents: the return of the ‘Serbian
question’ and the concept of a ‘Third’ Yugoslavia
In the communist period – as until then – intellectuals’ concepts of the state
were developed in reaction to the circumstances in which they took place and
the parameters set by the political authorities, usually in the form of constitutional
changes that were either being proposed or adopted. As the official concept of
Yugoslavia evolved from a more centralised federation to an essentially ‘confederal’
system of republics and provinces whose borders the Serbs felt disadvantaged them,
so did the Serbian intellectuals’ vision of that state turn from general acceptance
to widespread rejection. In the context of the post-Tito crisis when the common
state appeared to be unravelling, critical intellectuals came to elaborate a platform
for a ‘third’ Yugoslavia (the first being the interwar kingdom and the second the
communist federation), which would embrace both the principle of party pluralism
and a ‘democratic’ solution to the ‘national question’.
Despite their traumatic experience of the Second World War, the vast majority
of Serbs welcomed the re-creation of Yugoslavia by the communists. First of all,
Yugoslavia did fulfil the traditional goal of uniting the Serbian nation; although the
new federation effectively cut the Republic of Serbia to size, leaving over one-third
of ethnic Serbs outside its borders and creating within it only two autonomous
areas (Vojvodina and Kosovo), these internal divisions were clearly meant to be
purely administrative, satisfying the national aspirations of the other Yugoslav peoples
without, however, weakening the state. As Tito himself put it: ‘These borders, if
I may present them thus, are meant to be something like white lines on a marble
pillar. The borders of the federal units in Yugoslavia are not borders of division, but
borders of unification’.30 Second, although all the upper echelons of power in the
state were carefully balanced according to the ‘national key’, Serbs (particularly from
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where their wartime support for Tito’s Partisans
28 ‘Cˇetnicˇka koncepcija “homogene” Srbije i trijalisticˇke Jugoslavije. Projekat Stevana Moljevic´a
o granicama, drusˇtvenom uredjenju i spoljnoj politici “Velike Srbije” u obnovljenoj Jugoslaviji’, in
Petranovic´ and Zecˇevic´, Jugoslovenski federalizam, 675–7 passim.
29 Pavlowitch, Serbia, 142.
30 Speech in Zagreb, 21 May 1945, quoted in Predrag J. Markovic´, ‘Odnos Partije i Tita prema
jugoslovenskom i nacionalnom identitetu’, in Svetlana Ljuboja, Predrag Markovic´, Laslo Sekelj and
Mirjana Vasovic´, Identitet: Srbi i/ili Jugosloveni (Belgrade: Institut za evropske studije, 2001), 38.
Serbian Intellectuals and the ‘National Question’ in Historical Perspective 177
was the strongest) were proportionally overrepresented within the executive and
military apparatus and the Communist Party, giving them a stake in the new
state’s existence and a sense that their interests would be safeguarded.31 Finally, the
communists’ emphasis on the building of a new supra-national ‘socialist’ Yugoslav
identity, that would – if not replace – certainly mitigate existing national differences,
also contributed to the Serbs’ identification with Yugoslavia.32
After 1966, the equanimity with which Serbs viewed Yugoslavia was dramatically
eroded, however. With the purge of Aleksandar Rankovic´, Serbia’s leading
communist and the principal exponent of the ‘centralist’ line in the Yugoslav
leadership, the Party embarked on a new course, marked by the abandoning of
‘socialist Yugoslavism’ and an increasing condemnation of ‘great-state centralism’.33
The decentralising constitutional changes of 1967 to 1974 raised Serbia’s provinces
to republics in all but name and progressively turned the country into a de
facto confederation of eight ‘proto-states’.34 The Serbs’ traditional goal of national
‘liberation and unification’ thus appeared increasingly in jeopardy: over three million
now found themselves outside the borders of ‘inner’ Serbia (without the provinces),
amounting to about 40 per cent of their total population in Yugoslavia.35 In addition,
the affirmation of other Yugoslav nationalisms that accompanied these changes at
times took on distinctly anti-Serbian tones and even gave rise to reports of harassment
and discrimination against Serbs.36 Serbs outside ‘inner Serbia’ thus faced the prospect
of becoming a minority in increasingly autonomous and potentially even hostile
new ‘states’.37 Although criticism of the prevailing trends towards ‘confederalism’
31 Pavlowitch, Serbia, 162. See also Veljko Vujacˇic´, ‘Historical Legacies, Nationalist Mobilization and
Political Outcomes in Russia and Serbia: A Weberian View’, Theory and Society, 25 (1996), 763–801.
32 On the application of ‘socialist Yugoslavism’ in culture, see Wachtel, Making a Nation, 128–72.
On how this affected Serbs, see ch. 1 of Audrey Helfant Budding, ‘Serb Intellectuals and the National
Question, 1961–1991’, Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 1998.
33 The classic works on Yugoslavia’s internal transformation during this period are Dennison Rusinow,
The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948–1974 (London: Hurst, 1977), and Steven L. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion
in Socialist Yugoslavia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). On the evolution of Yugoslavia’s
constitutive concept, see also ch. 1 of Dejan Jovic´, Jugoslavija: Drzˇava koja je odumrla (Zagreb: Prometej,
2003).
34 Ivan Vejvoda, ‘Yugoslavia, 1945–91: From Decentralisation without Democracy to Dissolution’, in
David Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, eds., Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth
(London: Longman, 1996), 15. See also Veljko Vujacˇic´, ‘Institutional Origins of Contemporary Serbian
Nationalism’, East European Constitutional Review, 5, 4 (1996), 51–61.
35 According to the 1981 census, the total number of Serbs was 8,140,000 or 36.3 per cent of the
population of Yugoslavia, of whom 3,275,000 (41.3 per cent) were located outside ‘inner’ Serbia. Statistical
pocket-book of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Federal Statistical Office, 1991), 20, and Tim Judah, The Serbs (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 313–15.
36 In areas where Serbs experienced their ‘status reversal’, the perception was, of course, that their over-
representation in the Party, the state bureaucracy and the security appartus was simply being rectified. This
was particularly the case in Croatia in 1967–71 and Kosovo after 1968. Vujacˇic´, ‘Institutional Origins’,
57. In addition to Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, and Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, on Croatia see also
George Scho¨pflin, ‘The Ideology of Croatian Nationalism’, Survey, 19, 1 (1973), 123–46, and Jill Irvine,
The Croat Question (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 258–72, and on Kosovo Lenard J. Cohen, Serpent in the
Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosˇevic´ (Boulder: Westview, 2002), 61–71.
37 See Dejan Jovic´, ‘Fear of Being Minority as a Cause of the post-Yugoslav Wars’, Balkanologie, 1–2
(2000), 21–37.
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and individual national affirmation of Yugoslavia’s federal units had already begun to
emerge in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the most important expression of intellectual
discontent with the new course came in the 1980s, in the context of the deep and
all-encompassing post-Tito crisis.38
While the political and economic aspects of the crisis were felt throughout the
country and caused widespread disillusionment with the system, in Serbia they were
viewed primarily as a symptom of a much more serious problem: the failure of
Yugoslavia as a state. In the view of most Serbian intellectuals, the crisis itself had
been caused by the rise of particularist nationalism within the Party and the devolution
of power to the federal units, and state failure was evident in two ways that concerned
them directly: first, in the continuing incapacity of the leadership to find a solution
to the ‘Kosovo question’ and to halt the emigration of Kosovo’s Serbs from the
province, amid dramatic stories of human rights abuses and appeals for help to the
critical intelligentsia; and, second, in the effective disintegration of Yugoslavism on
the cultural level, which in the 1980s crystallised around the souring of relations with
Slovenian intellectuals.39 Whereas the ‘Kosovo question’ centred on the issue of the
Republic of Serbia’s statehood, the relationship with the Slovenes focused the debate
on the future of Yugoslavia. Things came to a head when the Yugoslav leadership
proposed a new round of constitutional change in 1987.
By the mid-1980s Yugoslavia’s leadership had come to realise that the contradic-
tions inherent in the 1974 constitution and the impossibility of dealing with the
economic crisis in the existing framework would necessitate a departure from the
status quo. As the prospect of constitutional change loomed once again, two distinct
positions began to emerge within the leadership – one that aimed at further con-
federalisation of the state, advocated by Slovenia, and another that called for a
degree of recentralisation and a return of some decision making powers to the
federal centre, backed by Serbia.40 After a period of intense debate, in January 1987
the Federal Presidency finally adopted a proposal for constitutional change. The
‘Proposal’ represented a compromise, aiming to satisfy both the ‘centralists’ and the
‘decentralists’. It aimed primarily to recreate a unified legal system, bring postal and
telecommunications systems and railroads under a central authority and strengthen
the federal administration in order to establish monetary discipline and repay the
38 On the post-Tito crisis, see Pedro Ramet, ed., Yugoslavia in the 1980s (Boulder: East European
Monographs, 1985); Harold Lydall, Yugoslavia in Crisis (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); and Susan Woodward,
Balkan Tragedy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 52–7. Its political aspects are also well
covered in Steven Burg, ‘Elite Conflict in Post-Tito Yugoslavia’, Soviet Studies, 38, 2 (1986), 170–93. For
Serbian intellectuals‘ responses to the crisis, see Dragovic´-Soso, ‘Saviours’, and Audrey Helfant Budding,
‘Systemic Crisis and National Mobilization: The Case of the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy’,
Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk. Harvard Ukrainian
Studies, 22 (1998), 49–69.
39 These are analysed extensively in Dragovic´-Soso, ‘Saviours’, particularly chs. 3 and 4. On the
disintegration of Yugoslavism in the cultural sphere see also Jasna Dragovic´-Soso, ‘Intellectuals and
the Collapse of Yugoslavia: The Disintegration of the Yugoslav Writers‘Union’ in Djokic´, Yugoslavism,
268–85.
40 On the debates in the political elite, see notably Jovic´, Jugoslavija, 310–27.
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foreign debt. It also included changes that would allow the extension of Serbia’s
legal and police jurisdiction over the autonomous provinces.41 The presentation of
the ‘Proposal’ was, however, accompanied by reassurances to those who opposed
recentralisation: it was specifically emphasised that there would be no encroachment
on the practice of decision making by consensus in the federal centre and on the
republics’ sovereignty.42 As was the practice, the ‘Proposal’ was then presented for
public debate in each of the federal units.
The two most far-reaching reactions to the official ‘Proposal’ came from the ranks
of the Slovenian and the Serbian intelligentsias, which both proposed their own,
more radical, alternatives. The Slovenian position had progressively been built up
over the course of the 1980s, amounting to an endorsement of Slovenia’s statehood,
potentially within a loose, confederal Yugoslavia.43 It was both a reaction to the rising
nationalist momentum in Serbia and a reflection of the Slovenes’ structural reality as
one of Yugoslavia’s smallest nations (just over 8 per cent of the total population), yet
located within a virtually ethnically homogenous ‘national state’.44 With increasingly
diverging interests from the poorer south, the Slovenes feared that any departure
from the more ‘confederal’ structure would reduce them to a minority in Yugoslavia
and lead to their constantly being outvoted in federal institutions. In April 1988,
Slovenian cultural organisations rejected the official ‘Proposal’ and adopted their
own alternative ‘constitution’ – one that evoked Slovenia’s ‘historical right to self-
determination, including the right to participation in a union of states or the secession
from such a union of states’.45 In it, there was no mention of Yugoslavia.
In contrast to the Slovenes, Serbian intellectuals still defined their position only
within the framework of a Yugoslav state. This was made clear in the most widely
endorsed document of that period, the ‘Contribution to the Public Debate on the
Constitution’, which was approved almost unanimously by Serbia’s main cultural
and scholarly institutions in March 1988.46 Noting in the preamble that Yugoslavia
was in the throes of an ‘existential crisis’ and that its model of ‘self-management
socialism’ had resulted in complete failure, the document spelled out in three
parts the changes to Yugoslavia’s political, economic and federal systems deemed
necessary.47 In essence, the intellectuals’ platform represented both a rejection of the
existing, crisis-ridden communist state and a proposal for a new, democratic, ‘third’
Yugoslavia.
41 See ‘Proposal of the Presidency of the SFRY to Proceed to the Amendment of the Constitution of
the SFRY’, Yugoslav Survey, 28, 1 (1987), 3–20.
42 Danas, 17 Feb. 1987, 10–11.
43 See particularly ‘Prispevki za slovenski nacionalni program’, Nova revija, 6, 57 (1987). The Slovenian
position is examined in more detail in Dragovic´-Soso, ‘Saviours’, 189–95, and Jovic´, Jugoslavija, 429–42.
44 The Republic of Slovenia encompassed 1,712,445 of the 1,754,000 Slovenes in Yugoslavia and had
no significant minorities.
45 ‘Predlog slovenacˇkih pisaca: republicˇki Ustav’, Knjizˇevne novine, 755 (1988), 17 (emphasis added).
46 It was adopted by the Writers’ Association of Serbia and by Serbia’s sociological and philosophical
societies.
47 ‘Prilog javnoj raspravi o ustavu’, Knjizˇevne novine, 751 (1988), 1.
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In the same vein as their Slovenian counterparts, Serbian intellectuals called for
‘the abolition of all references to ideology, as well as the leading party’s monopoly
of power and of all forms of party-state’. Instead they proposed the creation of a
new system which would be based on ‘different political organisations of citizens’,
free and fair direct elections to all state institutions and the respect of civil and
human rights. They also criticised the ‘extensive and irrational’ interference of the
state and the ruling party in Yugoslavia’s economy and called for ‘equality’ between
‘social, state and private forms of ownership’.48 In this sense, the document ‘exuded a
clear demand for democratic change’, as anti-nationalist intellectuals later emphasised
when explaining their endorsement of it.49 Indeed, the focus of the debate about this
proposal in the Writers’ Association of Serbia pitted advocates of systemic change
against defenders of the existing socialist model, and the final vote showed the
overwhelming preponderance of the former – over three hundred votes were cast in
favour of adopting the document and only nine against (with three abstentions).50
The ‘Contribution to the Public Debate on the Constitution’ also included
substantive changes to the country’s federal system. Unlike the Slovenian intellectuals’
‘constitution’, this document did not openly envisage the possibility of Serbian
statehood outside Yugoslavia and, in this sense, it was firmly grounded within the
dominant tradition of Serbian state concepts since the beginning of the twentieth
century. Despite its Yugoslav orientation, however, the intellectuals’ ‘Contribution’
contained elements that were clearly aimed at securing Serbian interests within the
existing Yugoslav framework. It effectively proposed the concurrent reintegration of
both the Yugoslav federation and the Republic of Serbia, which appeared plausible
on the surface but was in reality deeply contradictory and inconsistent.
In an effort to counter Yugoslavia’s post-1974 ‘confederalised’ order which
gave primacy to the federal units over the centre, the ‘Contribution’ proposed a
referendum to decide Yugoslavia’s new executive and legislative institutions, including
the replacement of the Federal Presidency – which consisted of representatives of
Yugoslavia’s federal units who reached decisions by consensus – by a single ‘President
of the Republic’. It also called for the reform of the Federal Council, to include
alongside the chamber of the republics a one-man one-vote chamber (abolished by
the decentralising constitutional changes of the early 1970s). This reformed Federal
Council would thus ensure that ‘all citizens be equally represented, and the republics
according to the number of their citizens’.51 Although this change was justified in
terms of redefining the system in favour of the individual citizen, in practice it
could have put Yugoslavia’s larger nations and republics at an advantage depending
on the competences of the new chambers. To the opponents of re-centralisation,
48 ‘Prilog’, 1, 4. Nevertheless, in its economic section, the document did emphasise the need for
some form of social democracy, based on ‘principles of solidarity and the defence of workers from
exploitation’, which shows a desire to safeguard some of the underlying tenets of Yugoslavia’s model of
‘workers’ self-management’.
49 Vesna Pesˇic´ quoted in Nadezˇda C´etkovic´, Mozˇes´ ti to, Vesna, mozˇes´ (Belgrade: Krug, 2000), 103.
50 ‘Skupsˇtinska diskusija’, Knjizˇevne novine, 751 (1988), 7.
51 ‘Prilog’, 1.
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this proposal appeared as a thinly veiled attempt to give the Serbs (who represented
over one-third of Yugoslavia’s total population) and the Republic of Serbia (which,
including the two autonomous provinces, contained over 40 per cent of Yugoslavia’s
citizens) more say in federal decision making.52 Another clause in the document
showed more clearly that the underlying goal of Yugoslavia’s reintegration was Serbian
national unity: the ‘Contribution’ noted the fact that Yugoslavia’s internal borders
were not ethnic borders, and it advocated ‘complete national, spiritual and cultural
integrity of each Yugoslav nation regardless of the republic or province in which
it resides’. It called for a guarantee to members of a nation residing in a different
republic that they would be allowed ‘the creation of independent political and cultural
associations and organizations, ties with their own nation, education in and official use
of their own language and alphabet’.53
At the same time, the ‘Contribution’ argued that the 1974 Constitution had
effectively partitioned the Republic of Serbia by increasing the powers of the
provinces, and it demanded the establishment of the republic as a state with rights
and jurisdiction over its whole territory ‘in the same way as other republics making
up the Yugoslav union’: ‘All republics in Yugoslavia must be established on the same
principle, as either citizens’ states or national states. If the principle of national states
is applied throughout Yugoslavia, then Serbia too must be established as the national
state of the Serbs.’ As an extension of this demand, the document called for the
abolition of Kosovo’s and Vojvodina’s ‘state sovereignty’ (although maintaining their
autonomy to some unspecified degree), which in practice meant the loss of their
right to direct representation in the federal centre as well as of their veto power
in the republic’s institutions. The document argued that the provinces had to be
subordinated to the republic, in order finally to abolish the ‘political inequality of
the Serbian nation in the Yugoslav federation’, while the non-Serb ‘nationalities’54
(mainly Albanians and Hungarians) living on the territory of the Republic of Serbia
would be guaranteed all their basic human and civil rights. Finally, the document
called for the universal application of the right to territorial autonomy on the basis of
either the specific national make-up of a particular region (as in the case of Kosovo)
or of its historical specificity (as in the case of Vojvodina), in accordance with the
freely expressed will of the population living there. In other words, all republics had
to be subject to new constitutional solutions if they contained such ethnically or
historically diverse regions – not only Serbia.55
52 According to the 1981 census, Serbs made up 8,140,000 or 36.3 per cent of Yugoslavia’s total
population and, in 1989, the Republic of Serbia had a population of 9,833,000 of Yugoslavia’s total
population of 23,695,000. Statistical Pocket-Book 1991, 20 and 16 respectively.
53 ‘Prilog’, 4 (emphasis added).
54 ‘Nationality’ was the term used to designate those ethnic groups living in Yugoslavia who had
another national state and were therefore not entitled to their own republic within the Yugoslav federation.
The two largest ‘nationalities’ were the Albanians (according to the 1981 census, 1,730,000 or 7.7 per
cent of Yugoslavia’s population) and the Hungarians (427,000 or 1.9%). Statistical Pocket-Book 1991, 20.
55 All citations from ‘Prilog’, 4.
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The predominant concept of the state embodied by the ‘Contribution’ and
endorsed by the Serbian intelligentsia in 1988 was not ‘Greater Serbian’, in that
it did not demand the complete abolition of the autonomous provinces and a
redrawing of the borders between the republics, as a small minority of more radical
intellectuals advocated at the time.56 It was also neither genuinely ‘centralist’ nor
‘decentralist’, but most of all incoherent, with references to different and, in the
Yugoslav context, mutually irreconcilable principles (national self-determination vs.
constitutional rights of the republics, including – implicitly – the inviolability of their
borders). Its revival of the idea of a one-man one-vote chamber and a president of
the federation, along with its call for the unity of each Yugoslav nation regardless
of where its members resided, all went against the ‘confederal’ elements in the
constitution – notably the sovereignty of the republics and decision making by
consensus in the federal centre. On the other hand, however, the document implicitly
endorsed this same ‘confederal’ order and existing republican borders by calling for the
establishment of the Republic of Serbia as a ‘state’ with jurisdiction over its whole
territory. Finally – to take its contradictions even further – after thus diminishing
the importance of the provinces, the document also called for an extension of the
principle of autonomy to the other Yugoslav republics.
As long as Yugoslavia still existed and as long as this platform did not translate into
policy, its inherent contradictions could remain latent. Although a few intellectuals
did note them at the time, their criticisms neither formed the heart of the debate
nor did they receive any response.57 The dissolution of the common state, which
was to take place three years after the ‘Contribution’, still did not appear as a distinct
possibility to the vast majority of the Serbian intelligentsia when this document
was issued in 1988. Yet a few intellectuals foresaw – indeed, perhaps even desired –
Yugoslavia’s demise. One of them was the novelist Dobrica C´osic´ the leading figure
of Serbia’s intellectual opposition who presented the ‘Contribution’ to the public in
1988 and who – according to his own account – managed to include in it the one
point he believed to be the most important.58 In the preamble of the ‘Contribution’,
hidden within the plethora of proposals for the reform of Yugoslavia, was one clause
that allowed a different and more ominous interpretation:
All fundamental questions of Yugoslavia’s social and state organisation, including the use of the right
to national self-determination including secession, must be decided on the basis of an all-Yugoslav
56 The principal advocates of the more radical line at the time were sociologist Vojislav Sˇesˇelj and
writer Vuk Drasˇkovic´, whose parties were to occupy the right wing in Serbia’s first multi-party elections
in 1990. Once the war broke out in 1991, however, Drasˇkovic´ changed his stance on border changes. For
Sˇesˇelj’s views in the constitutional debate, see Knjizˇevne novine, 751 (1988), 9; Drasˇkovic´’s are elaborated
in ‘Sˇta menjati u ustavu’, in Vuk Drasˇkovic´, Koekude Srbijo (Belgrade: Nova Evropa, 1990, 75–6).
57 See, for example, Djoko Stojicˇic´’s points in the debate on the ‘Contribution’, in ‘Skupsˇtinska
diskusija’, Knjizˇevne novine, 751 (1988), 7.
58 Dobrica C´osic´, Pisˇcˇevi zapisi (1981–1991) (Belgrade: Filip Visˇnjic´, 2002), 249. On C´osic´’s vision of
Yugoslavia’s dissolution, see notably Audrey Budding’s contribution to this issue.
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referendum which would prevent the ‘majorisation’ of any one nation and would allow the free
expression of the political will of all Yugoslav citizens.59
Although the document did not elaborate on the way in which such a Yugoslav-
wide referendum would be carried out, interpreted or applied in ethnically mixed
areas, its aim was clearly to undermine the legitimacy of any republican claim to
independence and to reserve the right to self-determination only for Yugoslavia’s
nations (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Muslims, Macedonians and Montenegrins, but not
the ‘nationalities’ such as the Kosovo Albanians).60 By doing so, this clause opened
up the possibility of creating nationally defined states if Yugoslavia failed. In other
words, by defining self-determination in national as opposed to republican terms, it
effectively allowed for the option of a future redrawing of republican borders and the
creation of a ‘Greater Serbian’ state – a state which could potentially encompass both
the ethnically preponderantly Albanian province of Kosovo and those territories in
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina which contained Serbian populations. When this
implicit agenda became explicit in 1991 and when Serbia’s leadership resorted to war
and ‘ethnic cleansing’ to achieve these aims, the once united intellectual opposition
effectively disintegrated – as some endorsed this policy, others rejected the means
employed but not the ends, and others still refused both.
Conclusion
The Serbian intellectuals’ attempt to conceptualise a ‘third’ Yugoslavia on the eve
of the disintegration of the ‘second’ marked the unsuccessful end of a long search
for a ‘Yugoslav’ solution to the Serbian national question. Common sense would
have dictated that – in order to be viable – such a solution to the Serbs’ national
goal of ‘liberation and unification’ also had to be acceptable to the other Yugoslav
peoples living intermingled with the Serbs. The nineteenth-century concepts of a
South Slav union as an extension of the existing Serbian state clearly were not,
considering the separate national identities of the peoples inhabiting those territories.
The interwar kingdom and even the post-1945 federation remained too centralist to
satisfy the national aspirations of (at least some) non-Serbs in Yugoslavia. Yet, as
became clear with the creation of the Croatian banovina in 1939 and again following
the ‘confederalisation’ of Yugoslavia after 1966, any attempt to decentralise the state
on the basis of nationally defined territorial entities inevitably also implied the
59 ‘Prilog’, 1, emphasis added. ‘Majorisation’ was a term commonly used in Yugoslavia to designate
the constant and illegitimate outvoting of a specific (ethnic) minority in political and cultural fora. It
was invoked in the 1980s notably by the Serbs in Kosovo’s institutions and by the Slovenes in federal
institutions.
60 Who ‘owned’ the right to self-determination – Yugoslavia’s republics or nations – was always
unclear in Yugoslavia’s many post-1945 constitutions. See Audrey Budding’s illuminating discussion of
this problem in her ‘Nation/People/Republic: Self-Determination in Socialist Yugoslavia’, in Lenard
J. Cohen and Jasna Dragovic´-Soso eds., Rethinking Yugoslavia’s Dissolution (Chicago: Purdue University
Press, forthcoming, 2004). Indeed, the clause in the ‘Contribution’ on national self-determination and an
all-Yugoslav referendum was precisely the opposite of the option taken by the international community in
1991–92 to recognise Yugoslavia’s republics as independent states, based on separate republican referenda.
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creation of a Serbian entity, with all the accompanying dilemmas concerning the
definition of its borders and its own internal arrangement. The ‘Serbian question’
was thus not ‘imagined’ or ‘invented’ by intellectuals in the 1980s, but represented
a structural reality of the Serbs’ dispersal throughout Yugoslavia and the inherent
interconnectedness of all the ‘national questions’ in the region.
The Serbian intellectuals’ final attempt to envisage a democratic ‘third’ Yugoslavia
at the end of the 1980s was as unviable as it was late. It was not an explicit call for a
‘Greater Serbia’ or a change of borders, let alone for ‘ethnic cleansing’. It contained
a clear endorsement of notions of a pluralist democracy and respect for civil and
human rights, as did most platforms emanating from the ‘critical intelligentsia’ at
the time. Yet its liberal and Yugoslav orientation could not disguise a preoccupation
with exclusively Serbian interests, which rendered the document contradictory and
incoherent and provided a poor basis for ensuring the survival of the federation.
Intellectuals in the former Yugoslavia were important primarily as the carriers of
a political alternative to the existing regime in a situation of single party rule and
the absence of a political opposition. Were Yugoslavia ever to be reconstituted as a
genuinely democratic state, this could only have been achieved through a process of
inter-ethnic negotiation and compromise, in which all sides endorsed a coherent set
of principles and accepted something less than their maximum demands. The Serbian
intellectual opposition and its counterparts elsewhere in Yugoslavia were the natural
vectors of such a process, in view of their declared commitment to democracy, civil
society and human rights, and their desire for systemic change. When it came to
rethinking Yugoslavia, however, despite their rhetoric the intellectuals proved to be
no better than the undemocratic communist leaderships that they criticised. That they
did not embrace their historical opportunity to act as a genuine democratic alternative
to the uncompromising and belligerent policies of their political leaderships thus not
only eclipsed the option of a democratic ‘third’ Yugoslavia but also contributed to
the violent disintegration of the socialist ‘second’ one.
